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The Betrayal of Animal Protection - The Corruption of the USDA Statement of Marshal Smith, USDA Whistleblower I am perhaps one of the least likely people to have turned government
whistleblower. I was raised in a family whose agricultural interests
included a cattle ranch in south Texas. My father was Executive Director
for the USDA's Fever Tick Eradication program. For nine years I was a
member of the 4H club. I was comfortable with structure and rules. I was
also brought up to adhere to a personal code of ethics; that meant doing
what was right. With my father's code of ethics as my model and a desire to protect
the livestock industry, I joined USDA in 1976, while in my early
twenties. To me, USDA exemplified doing what was right to protect the
public and industry. I was assigned to a mounted patrol along the Rio
Grande under the Veterinary Services Fever Tick Eradication Program. In
1979 I moved to Big Bend National Park as a Quarantine Enforcement
Officer and continued riding horseback patrol for Veterinary Services.
From there I was promoted to a Supervisory Animal Health Technician with
the Screwworm Eradication Program, acting as an agricultural attaché to
the US Embassy in Mexico. I resigned for a short time to go into private
business but returned to USDA in 1984. In 1984 I was assigned to brucellosis eradication efforts in Fort
Smith, Arkansas. It was during my tenure in Arkansas that I first
learned of the Animal Welfare Act. I learned that pet producers. i.e.
breeders for pet stores were required to be licensed and inspected to
conform with federal standards. Since USDA’s brucellosis eradication
efforts had been successful I volunteered to participate in the Animal
Welfare Program. In 1985, I volunteered as an inspector for USDA'S Animal Welfare
Program in order to ensure that puppy mills followed federal
regulations. I recall the brief training period, which included viewing
footage from a news show that had investigated pet store breeders. There
was no discussion following that footage and no mention of the fact that
USDA had, since 1967, been responsible for ensuring that conditions like
those no longer existed. Thus began many of the naive assumptions I
would make in the subsequent years when I was committed to believing the
agency I worked for. I assumed then that since the problem of puppy
mills had been publicly disclosed, USDA taken remedial steps. I assumed
that the sobering news segment, my colleagues and I were viewing was old
footage. In the field, I would learn that my assumption was wrong. My territory included 40 kennels in northwest Arkansas. I approached
my new job conscientiously. Records of these pet producers were
transferred to me from a retiring inspector who told me, "If you’re
smart you'll do what I did, you’ll check everything is OK." I told him
that I intended to abide by the law. Another assumption: I assumed he
was a lazy good old boy, that he was not voicing the agency's mindset.
The kennels I visited had seemingly never been inspected. I was
overwhelmed by what I saw: the wretched looking animals, the mounds of
fecal matter reaching in some cases to my knees, at very least to the
wire caging of the rabbit hutches which most puppy millers used to house
the dogs. In every instance that I recall, the filth and deprivation
were shocking. I recorded scores of violations prompting complaints to
my supervisor in Little Rock. Luckily for me however, my supervisor, DR.
W. J. Ward, who had carved a niche for himself in the Animal Welfare
Program, supported me. I was given a cash award and Certificate of Merit
for my inspection activities. I assumed that further measures were taken to enforce the regulations
and bring offenders into compliance. I later learned that cases were not
developed for enforcement, and that those that were would languish years
before coming to hearing, when they would invariably be dismissed. Thus
some of the most horrendous conditions under which dogs were bred
festered, unfettered by federal intervention. I accepted a promotion and transfer to Jefferson City, Missouri in
1986 as a Compliance officer, later reclassified to Senior Investigator.
In this capacity I documented violations of regulations which were
administered under the Veterinary Service Program; the cases were a
combination of animal quarantine, animal welfare and veterinary
accreditation violations. During this time, my colleagues and I were
instructed to review the Animal Welfare case files and close them out
with a VS Form 3-60. These were "warning tickets" used to essentially
dismiss cases due to a backlog at the Office of General Counsel (OGC).
These cases represented the more deplorable pet breeding facilities and
I was dismayed at USDA's seemingly inability, or unwillingness, to deal
with the violators as the law stipulated. At this time USDA announced its re-organization which would separate
the Animal Welfare Program from the Veterinary Services division. Agency
officials publicly stated that the newly independent Animal Welfare
Program's workforce of VMO’s and inspectors would be dedicated solely to
animal welfare inspections. With the focus exclusively on the Animal
Welfare Program it was touted that inspections and enforcement would be
more effective and consistent. I would later hear that this
re-organization was simply a strategic ploy to obtain larger
congressional appropriations. Under Veterinary Services funds
appropriated for brucellosis eradication had been allegedly diverted to
subsidize Animal Welfare activities. With an independent division
designated exclusively for the Animal Welfare Program additional
appropriations were needed to properly fund the program. To this day the
bulk of the funds account for salaries and equipment. The resulting reorganization formed Regulatory Enforcement and Animal
Care (REAC). It consisted of two distinct divisions; one for the
enforcement of all APHIS regulations, Regulatory Enforcement (RE); and
one for inspections, Animal Care (AC), which was responsible solely for
the Animal Welfare Program. These branches were supposed to work
together; Animal Care performing inspections, Regulatory Enforcement
developing cases against alleged violators of various APHIS programs
including AC. Five geographic sectors were created, but the RE and AC
boundaries did not mesh. For example, investigators stationed in
Missouri reported to the North Central Sector while Animal Care
inspectors reported to the South Central Sector. This arrangement made
for confusion and inefficiency. Following the creation of REAC, Dr. Edward Slauter left his post as
Director of the Animal Health Division of the Missouri Department of
Agriculture. Why he left this position is telling: he was under pressure
from the state's Attorney General for his failure to enforce state
animal health regulations. Slauter, an associate of Dr. Joan Arnoldi,
the newly named Deputy Administrator for REAC, found a welcoming home at
the newly created division. REAC's publicly stated mission to enforce the Animal Welfare Act and
bring offenders into compliance is articulated by Dr. Glosser, APHIS
Administrator at that time. As Glosser put it, REAC would "lead people
into compliance," through "a flexible, dynamic body of regulations." I was hopeful then that REAC would begin to address the serious
inconsistencies in the inspection program and the agency's chronic
failure to seek legal remedy against offenders. By 1990, my Midwest colleagues and I were working fewer cases than
prior to REAC's creation. Congress and the media however were not as
willing to overlook transgressions right under the nose of USDA. A
September 7, 1990 letter from Indiana Congressman, John Meyer, related
to a complaint from one of his constituents who attended an exotic
animal park and described it to Meyer as a concentration camp for
animals. Forced out of its passive role into action, Animal Care under
Dr. Mott investigated and reported three violations; I found 12
categories of violations, with numerous sub category violations. During
the course of my investigation I also learned that the Missouri
Department of Conservation had convicted the manager of this exotic
animal park for hunting those exotic animals under his protective care.
The thoroughly documented case was sent on to the USDA attorneys but
never reached hearing and prosecution. At the end of 1990, Dr. Walter A. Christensen, Animal Care Sector
Supervisor, requested an investigation of a Stover, Missouri kennel
operated by two sisters, Janice Knierim and Rhoda Burnett. The case is a
classic example of USDA's corruption of established procedures. The
kennel in question had been previously licensed under Mr. And Mrs.
Vinson Whittle, their parents, who USDA convinced to surrender their
license and re-apply under their daughters’ names to clean their slate
of severe violations; a new license was thus issued, giving this same
kennel a fresh slate, on paper. Yet the same and worse violations
persisted: sick dogs ("dehydration, open sores, skin infections"), lack
of water and food; improper records; failure to account for the
disposition of many of the dogs they sold. My division, Regulatory Enforcement was, however, never called in to
investigate. When the sisters refused Animal Care access to their
kennel, Animal Care requested intervention by the local sheriff to gain
entry, this in an effort to keep in-house Animal Care's own negligence
in issuing the license. The warrant secured by the Sheriff’s department
was invalid due to an incorrect address. Later AC did gain access and
the kennel passed inspection. But, as indicated by documents in my case
file, a complainant who phoned in asked Dr. Slauter "How could they
pass? Your inspector must be on the take." Slauter responded, "I know
the inspector, he's an excellent inspector." In 1996 the inspector,
Robert Dunning, was nabbed in a FBI sting for soliciting a bribe from a
kennel owner. For me, 1992 was a turning point. The stolen pet issue had gotten so
hot that local sheriff departments were asking USDA for help. One in
Missouri told me pet theft was so widespread that it wanted USDA to set
up a hotline to track cases; his request fell on deaf ears. Bunchers
were in their heyday, picking up animals from newspaper ads,
neighborhoods and I could not understand why USDA was denying there was
a problem. I speculated at the time that the situation had gotten so out
of hand that the catch up work alone would inundate Animal Care's staff,
in addition to reflect poorly on management. I later understood this as
an attempt to keep the egregious, long unaddressed problems confined
in-house. Animal Care had begun isolating itself from its sister
division- it was covering its tracks by excluding Enforcement officers
like myself from investigations. To conceal their misdeeds Animal Care turned to local sheriff's
rather than its Enforcement arm, as in the Donald Wood cattery. The
conditions there festered over time: sick animals, lack of food or
water, improper identification of cats, failure to remove excrement from
cages, lack of veterinary care to the extent an inspection report noted:
"The gravity of this situation is compounded by the fact that the
animals were apparently temporarily abandoned." A warrant was issued
with the assistance of the local sheriff and five cats were seized; the
warrant, however, did not authorize the seizure. Regulatory Enforcement
was subsequently called in to clean up the mess. In an apparent effort
to destroy the evidence of the illegal confiscation, Dr. Christensen
ordered the cats destroyed. The APHIS Administrator had to sign a
confiscation order after the fact. Had Animal Care gone through the
proper channels the confiscation would have been legal. In the Bryant case, yet another case of improper authorizations by
Animal Care involved instructions given to an inspector to falsify his
reports. When I accompanied this inspector and entered the filthy kennel
building, which housed the puppy mill, my eyes immediately started
burning from the ammonia vapors; there was no ventilation. One-gallon
cans, which formerly contained toxic paint, served as water buckets.
When I returned to our vehicle, the Animal Care inspector wrote up his
report, clearly omitting some of the most serious and obvious
violations. He explained to me that his supervisor had told him "not to
document too many violations." I then phoned my own supervisor to
discuss this situation. I followed up with a memo, which I faxed to his
office as requested. I subsequently learned that the memo had been
destroyed "to protect" me. I had not done anything wrong and I was angry
that my superiors would not or could not address the issue of a
falsified document or the alleged instructions to do so. This was the last pet producing facility I was asked to visit. In
fact, I was not given cases from Animal Care until year-end 1992 when I
was dispatched to examine the records of two long time research
suppliers, Bruce Barnfield and Randall Huffstetler. The Animal Care
inspector responsible for inspecting Huffstetler's kennel had formerly
worked at one of the dealer's clients, a university in Missouri. This
same inspector had previously called Huffstetler for tips on getting
hired by the agency. He returned the favor quid pro quo. On the occasion
of my visit, he gave Huffstetler an inappropriate correction deadline. I
reported my objections to this action to my supervisor. Huffstetler
lodged his own complaint: he was incensed that he had been cited at all.
Dr. Bruce Mammeli, Assistant Sector Supervisor, sent an apologetic
letter to the dealer exempting him from responding to those citations.
Suddenly the inspection had become simply a "fact finding mission." As
Mammeli wrote: "On fact finding inspections correction dates are not
given, therefore they are not mandatory and will not be held against you
during your next routine inspection." The following year I was asked to review 16 computer generated pages
of selected excerpts relating to suppliers of random source animals
whose records I had copied. I was not allowed, however, to use the
records I had copied, only what headquarters had sent down to me. The
resulting case, which I prepared with such selective evidence, was, not
surprisingly, returned to me as insufficient for prosecution. The
voluminous records I had copied which indicated scores of violations had
disappeared. It was not until 1996 that, under pressure from the Office
of General Counsel (OGC) and finally a threat of prosecution,
Huffstetler voluntarily relinquished his license. At that time, it was advantageous for the sake of public relations
and political expediency to finally sacrifice this one dealer, whose
kennel should never have been licensed. In May 1992 the OIG issued its audit of APHIS. For me, the report was
confirmation of what I had long been observing and reporting back to my
supervisors: there was internally an ongoing pattern of mismanagement,
lack of enforcement of the regulations, and a passive, reactive
administering of the Animal Welfare Program. OlG concluded that "APHIS
cannot ensure the humane care and treatment of animals at all dealer
facilities as required by the Animal Welfare Act...did not inspect
dealer facilities with a reliable frequency and it did not enforce
timely corrections of violations found during inspections." Of the 284
facilities reviewed, 46, or 16.2 percent, had received no annual
inspection; 80.8 percent of the remaining facilities found to be in
violation had received no follow-up; that APHIS does not have an
effective inspection monitoring system... had not timely penalized
facilities found to be in violation - in one case "continuous,
uncorrected violations” were noted as far back as July 1988. Notwithstanding this scathing federal report, USDA took no corrective
action. Valuable time and resources were thus wasted and admonitions
soon forgotten by USDA. Operationally, USDA continued to fall down on
the job. In the next year, 1993, there were even fewer inspections fewer
re-inspections, fewer cases investigated and reviewed, fewer cases
submitted to Regulatory Enforcement; fewer compliance inspections; fewer
cases submitted to OGC; fewer official warnings, and on and on. Licensed
facilities in violation remained virtually unchanged. I began to
understand that USDA had assumed the position that it was above the law.
Meanwhile, complaints had been flooding USDA in states hardest hit by
pet theft, including Missouri and Iowa. Media were breaking stories of
animals vanishing without at trace. USDA had been forced to respond. A
mid West Stolen Dog Task Force had been hastily formed in 1990; I was
not asked to participate. Nearly 150 pages of unreleased field
investigator notes indicated that dog dealers under investigation had in
a few months period obtained dogs from 148 illegal sources, from dealers
who had been convicted in local court of stealing pets, and from long
dead individuals or those who simply did not exist. Yet APHIS
administrator Dr. James Glosser issued quite another finding to the
public and press. USDA concluded, "There was a lack of substantive
evidence that dealers were knowingly dealing in stolen pets.” Inspectors
were told to offer licenses to the 148 illegal suppliers, also known as
bunchers. Providing improper statements to the government (18, U.S.C., 1001)
could have sent USDA administrators themselves to jail for a maximum of
five years, and a $10,000 fine, let alone imposed maximum sanctions
against the dog dealers. This dog task force would be the first of three, which provided
fodder for the agency's self-justified inaction and involved significant
laundering of data and tampering with evidence. A January 1993 task
force, from which again I was excluded, found rampant falsification of
records among long prospering violators in Missouri and Arkansas, and
evidence that dealers were obtaining dogs and cats from “Free to Good
Home” ads and from other dealers who had been convicted of illegally
acquiring animals. One dealer whose underground, football field size
underground kennels service most of the large mid west research
institutions, burned his records prior to an announced inspection visit
and, according to one of its Senior Investigators, moved about 300 dogs
overnight to undisclosed locations. Instead of aggressively pursing this
dealer, the Task Force was instructed to drop his from further
investigation. Ultimately the entire task force project was canned, despite or
perhaps because of, accumulated evidence of wrongdoing by USDA
licensees. In November of the same year, another stolen dog task force
was revived, this largely in response to the publication of STOLEN FOR
PROFIT, a book about the theft of pets and USDA's role in enabling those
crimes. This Stolen Dog Traceback Project like its predecessors
uncovered severe, widespread violations of the law at dog dealer
kennels. According to USDA regulation, 9 CFR, Section 2.132 (b), dealers must
determine whether or not a particular animal was born and raised on his
supplier's premises. Yet USDA had constructed pre-written affidavits,
which omitted this crucial question, thus exempting critical evidence
from case files. I had sent on records containing obvious violations,
which should have again justified punitive action, but when those
records were returned to me they were purged of these observations and
watered down to a handful of relatively minor violations. In one case,
Animal Care referred to Enforcement only 17 minor offenses out of
hundreds of major, well-documented violations. National news magazine shows had picked up the story. I was
interviewed in silhouette for "Eye to Eye with Connie Chung." Although I
was a key source I remained anonymous, out of fear of agency reprisals.
Yet there were mounting suspicions that I had provided the author with
damning internal documents and that it was in fact I on the news show.
By the end of 1993 I had been removed from Animal Care cases involving
dogs and cats. My work assignments were principally in the area of
animal quarantine cases under the purview of Veterinary Services. I was
totally out of the dealer and puppy mill investigation loop. Throughout 1994 into 1995, USDA's public exposure and vulnerability
was increasing. The re-release in paperback of Stolen for Profit drew
yet more public and media attention to stolen pets and USDA's role.
Despite specific federal code Title 7, Section 2159 "Authority to Apply
for Injunction" if the agency believed that "any dealer is dealing in
stolen animals or is placing the health of any animal in serious
danger," the only occasional cases which made their way to the OGC were
invariably granted safe haven. In its by then 28 years monitoring
dealers - some of whom had been found guilty by local courts of stealing
pets, dealers who had been housing animals in everything from front load
dryers to mailboxes to chicken coops, dealers who were selling infected
and dying animals to research institutions, the USDA Attorney General
had only once taken injunctive action. At this point, only the high
profile cases, which had attracted media attention were being, resolved
other than by warnings. Under threat of punitive action, relatively
small dealers voluntarily relinquished their licenses, among them
Randall Huffstetler. This was good PR for USDA, which could claim to
shut these dealers down. USDA's "discretionary powers" were, however, enabling the agency to
re- write its federally mandated job description, favoring industry (dog
dealers and their research, puppy mills and their pet store clients)
over the public. The agency was making obtaining and retaining those
licenses by violators easier. It was simply governing "by consensus,"
and actively removing dealers from legal obligation to comply with
regulations. One USDA memo specifically states that corrective measures
for non-compliant items cited during routine inspections should be a
“…consensus between the inspector and the licensee or registrant.” It is particularly noteworthy that USDA continued its laissez faire
policies despite a 1995 internal report by the Office of Inspector
General identifying the agency's negligence and non-enforcement. USDA
seemed to have also lost control over not only dealer kennels but its
own employees. During a 1994 annual meeting in Oklahoma word got out
that a USDA employee within Animal Care had reportedly embezzled over
$80,OOO from USDA, primarily in dog dealer license fees and subsequently
sabotaged the computer systems so that it became impossible to determine
the full extent of this damage. Shortly after the 0IG report was released, REAC's own internal
assessment was provided to headquarters; this report was not made
public. In fact, administrators flatly told press inquirers that no such
report existed. In the summer of 1994 Morley Cook, had conducted a
review of the South Central Sector REAC program whose office was in Fort
Worth, Texas. Cook found significant failings within that area's
program: the data base system impeded efficiency and management control;
public complaints were not being recognized; inspectors were not
adequately trained and lacked sufficient information for their job
performance; REAC policy was not uniform, etc. What the report did not
mention was that the Sector Supervisor, Dr. Walter Christensen had been
taking matters into his own hands. Since 1992, Dr. Christensen had been arbitrarily clearing Enforcement
files of violators. Animal Care supervisors had access to the Compliance
Investigations Tracking System (CITS) which tracks cases from initiation
date to final resolution. This was initially an investigative tool
designed to track the time spent gathering evidence and completion of an
investigative report subsequent to formal prosecution. Dr. Christensen
lobbied for and was eventually granted access to the CITS System so AC
could track cases handled by the AC Sector offices. However, Dr.
Christensen was closing out cases, oftentimes the same day of their
entry. He was accomplishing this by arbitrarily issuing warning tickets.
In many cases the violation would have justified a far more punitive
action, for example dealer license suspension and even confiscation of
animals whose health and safety was in danger. It was my understanding
the Enforcement's investigations were a management tool for Animal Care,
a back-up for any violations Animal Care had failed to observe. This,
apparently, is just what Animal Care did not want: any further
indication of its negligence. To bolster its slack enforcement image,
the south central sector was padding its enforcement entries. In spite of or perhaps because of my frustration with USDA
authorities I applied for a promotion and was interviewed by RE Sector
Supervisor Neil Williamson concerning an Enforcement Specialist
position, a promotion that would have entailed my moving to Denver. I
even received a confirming letter. However, I received a call from
Williamson stating that he had been instructed by Ron Stanley, Deputy
Administrator for Regulatory Enforcement, to advise me that the job in
Denver had been "put on the shelf." I immediately faxed a memo to
Williamson, requesting clarification. A month later, on May 15, 1995 I was told by Dianne Shank, Regulatory
Enforcement Supervisor for the South Central region, that my position in
Jefferson City had suddenly been "abolished." I was also told that I had
to choose one of seven cities as my new duty station. There was no
mention of my promotion to the Denver office. The agency was asking for
an immediate reply indicating my compliance with its sudden new
directive. To address this clear evidence of retaliation, I contacted an
attorney. He advised me not to comply until I received a written request
and had an opportunity to review the agency's offer. On May 22 I advised
the agency that I had hired an attorney. That same day Ron Stanley left
me a voice mail stating that I would not have to relocate after all. I
do not believe the agency was prepared for me to take such aggressive
action. By now I was receiving only insignificant investigations which had no
merit. But my complaint concerning the rescinding of my promotion had
drawn the attention of OlG. In late November 1995, I was interviewed by
an investigator. He told me that Office of Inspector General was looking
into allegations of corruption within REAC. At this time, I was sent a
case from Animal Care. On fact value it seemed open and shut: minor
violations involving the unlicensed sale of some dogs to research.
Animal Care did not expect me to further investigate using the records
they supplied. I learned that this buncher had been selling dogs to one
of the major Arkansas based dealers during a period of ten years, using
his relative's names. Again I had, by simply doing my job, placed Animal
Care in a bad light. In 1997, that Arkansas dealer who received this
buncher's dogs would only be fined $5000 for his own longtime, serious
violations. Following OIG's inquiry I contacted the Government Accountability
Project (GAP) in Washington DC. GAP was ostensibly established to
address government whistleblower complaints. It was clear by now that I
was the subject of retaliation by the agency. GAP was not aggressive in
filing a complaint on my behalf, however. GAP suggested I accept USDA's
offer that would allow me to remain in the Midwest in my current
investigative position. The USDA had created a position that was
unacceptable in that I was to educate the industry and public regarding
Animal Care’s mission. I simply wanted to do the job I was assigned to
do, document alleged violations of APHIS regulations. I could not accept
an untenable compromise that would further isolate me. The on-paper supervisory position would have made me the target
continued hostility. Already my once amicable, productive relationship
with my longtime office mate in Jefferson City had been eroded. The
officer told me, "I'm tired of your whistleblowing shit" and expressed a
desire to "beat the shit out of me." He made these statements in the
presence of three superiors including Ron Stanley, *none of whom
defended me. Meanwhile Animal Care was consolidating its power. Through a voice
mail announcement -no paper trail, we were informed that Regulatory
Enforcement would be severed from Animal Care and transferred to the
Office of Management and Budget. By assigning enforcement to an office
which makes regulations, rather than enforcing them, the former REAC,
thus divested of it RE, would take even fewer steps to deal with alleged
violators. In February 1997, I resigned from USDA, a disheartening end to nearly
20 years of services. I forfeited my retirement as well as a lifetime
career. The untenable atmosphere had taken a toll. Fortunately, I found
a niche with IDA through friendships I had nurtured during my tumultuous
last few years with USDA. I quickly embarked on a war against puppy mill
leading national, regional, and local television crews to deplorable
facilities. On one of my escapades the news crew and I were shot at by
the kennel operator and the news vehicle hit with pellets from the
shotgun. The shooting incident was caught on tape yet two years later a
jury acquitted the shooter. The suffering and misery that I have seen and continue to see
motivate me to fight for the animals who have no voice, no
representation, and virtually no standing with our laws. I am determined
to expose the evil puppy mill industry, which is supported by the retail
pet industry. Each day our efforts improve thanks to those who have seen
a mill or vicariously experienced the agony victims of this industry
endure each day. Many will suffer and others die at the whim of people
motivated by greed instead of love for animals that they profess to the
world.
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Corruption of the USDA |
