An English Jesuit, writing at the turn of the last century, drew a
distinction between the "wanton cruelty" of doing anything to "vex or
annoy a brute beast for sport" and the blameless practice of "causing
pain to brutes in sport", on which no shadow of evil rested. "Nor are we
bound to make this pain as little as may be" (Joseph Rickaby, quoted by
James Gaffney in Animals on the Agenda, SCM 1998). Rickaby's general
argument about brute beasts was that, "not having understanding and
therefore not being persons", they could be used by humans with no more
care than "sticks and stones". His one exception, it seems, grew out of
a concern for the moral risk to humans from practising sadism on
animals. But for this lapse, Rickaby might have achieved the unreachable
goal of complete consistency on the subject of animal welfare.
There is, of course, little merit in being consistently wrong,
however irritating might be the alternative ragbag of sentiment,
half-truth and fudge. Today's theological consensus is that our respect
for the created world imposes on us an obligation to conserve and
nurture other species; but it usually stops short of proposing universal
veganism. The truth, though, is that our claim to care for other animal
species is seriously compromised as long as a large proportion of the
human race eats meat, wears leather, benefits from scientific advances
based on animal experimentation, builds furniture out of forest
hardwoods or drives too fast along country roads at dusk. There has been
an increase in sympathy for animals, but still too few are prepared to
act on it. Rickaby would have been justly scornful of the now common
view that is based on fur: if the fur is still attached, the animal
deserves our protection; if the fur is detached, the animal is an
ingredient.
Lord Burns has helped the fox-hunting debate by introducing harder
facts, for instance that more foxes are already controlled by shooting
than by hunting. But his central definition of concern, that hunting
"compromises the welfare" of the hunted animal, is so wide a definition
that it can be applied, arguably, to the slaughter of any animal, by any
means. It is the perception of this inconsistency that has so inflamed
the hunting debate. The ethical argument simply shifts to the next
criterion, that of necessity, and this introduces a scale of values
based largely on individual judgement. Thus, at present, the majority in
this country believes that the killing of animals for food is justified.
A similar majority believes that hunting for sport is wanton cruelty.
But there is no watertight door between the two issues. Meat-eaters
should be aware that animal welfare arguments will leak into other
ethical areas nearer to their hearts.
Church Times: Comment (16/6/2000)
Reproduced with Thanks.
