It was just a little over 20 years ago that I read The Great Ape Project
(St. Martin’s Press 1993.) In that book, Jane Goodall and thirty or so
others argue that chimpanzees and the other great apes have a right to life,
liberty, and to be protected from torture because they are enough like
humans in morally significant ways. These three rights were enumerated in “A
Declaration on Great Apes.” My wife and I were so moved by their arguments
that we sent a copy of the book to all the members of the U.S. Senate. In
many ways, Chimpanzee Rights is an extension of some of those arguments and
a worthwhile companion piece.
Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief is an extended amicus curiae
brief written by thirteen philosophers in support of the Nonhuman Rights
Project’s continuing legal efforts to have a court recognize specific
animals as legal persons under the law and through the use of habeas corpus,
to have them released from extreme prison-like confinement and sent to a
sanctuary dedicated to providing ex-captive chimpanzees the opportunity to
fuller lives. To-date, no judge has issued a writ to free any of the
Nonhuman Rights Project’s clients.
Chimpanzee Rights argues that the judges decisions were illogical,
misinformed, or based on frank errors in the authoritative works they cite
in their decisions that chimpanzees are not, and cannot be persons under the
law. Future courts have a high hurdle in front of them; the authors of
Chimpanzee Rights make a very strong case that existing language in the law
and in the works on which much of the pertinent legal theories are based are
unambiguous about the characteristics needed in order to be considered a
legal person, when read without bias or prejudgment.
The authors make a particularly strong argument when addressing what is
referred to as the social contract. The inability of animals to fulfill
responsibilities implied in the idea of a social contract is argued by many
supporters of the status quo to bar their legal recognition as persons. The
authors clarify this logical mistake by pointing out that the social
contract is created by persons, not the other way around.
Chimpanzee Rights provides a closely argued and very strong argument for the
courts to recognize the legal personhood of chimpanzees. Critics fear that
doing so will open the flood gates, which it will, but that hardly seems
reason enough to deny billions of the earth’s other inhabitants their
fundamental rights. Persons interested in this topic, and in the broader
question of our claim to rights in general will find much of interest and
value in this timely amicus curiae brief.
Foreword: Lori Gruen is William Griffin Professor of Philosophy at Wesleyan
University, USA, coordinator of the Wesleyan Animal Studies program, and
Professor of Feminist, Gender and Sexuality Studies and Science in Society.
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